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Abstract
Despite achieving remarkable performance on many im-
age classification tasks, state-of-the-art machine learning
(ML) classifiers remain vulnerable to small input pertur-
bations. Especially, the existence of adversarial examples
raises concerns about the deployment of ML models in
safety- and security-critical environments, like autonomous
driving and disease detection. Over the last few years, nu-
merous defense methods have been published with the goal
of improving adversarial as well as corruption robustness.
However, the proposed measures succeeded only to a very
limited extent. This limited progress is partly due to the
lack of understanding of the decision boundary and deci-
sion regions of deep neural networks. Therefore, we study
the minimum distance of data points to the decision bound-
ary and how this margin evolves over the training of a deep
neural network. By conducting experiments on MNIST,
FASHION-MNIST, and CIFAR-10, we observe that the deci-
sion boundary moves closer to natural images over training.
This phenomenon even remains intact in the late epochs of
training, where the classifier already obtains low training
and test error rates. On the other hand, adversarial train-
ing appears to have the potential to prevent this undesired
convergence of the decision boundary.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has facilitated technological advances in a
variety of domains, e.g. computer vision, natural language
processing, and robotics. However, the notable success in
achieving high test performances should not obscure the
fact that we are still lacking a sufficient understanding of
the functioning of deep neural networks.
In the past years, it has become apparent that deep neural
networks are quite brittle, in particular they are vulnerable
to small - even imperceptible - perturbations of the input
[1, 9]. This observation at least partially contradicts the
common belief that deep networks generalize well to
unseen, similar examples. These harmful inputs can be
the result of distributional shifts or general noise in the
environment of the classifier [36], e.g. unusual lighting or
weather conditions for an autonomous car. Alternatively,
they might be adversarial examples, i.e. perturbed natural
images that were intentionally crafted by some adversary
to cause misclassifications. In the past, these two types
of harmful perturbations have been analyzed by mostly
separate research communities, namely the corruption
robustness and the adversarial robustness researchers.
Recently it has become more and more evident that the
vulnerability to these different perturbations is closely
connected and should therefore not be analyzed separately
[18]. For example, in [13] the authors derived a promising
estimate for the size of small worst-case adversarial pertur-
bations with the help of the test error on additive Gaussian
noise.
With the seminal work of Biggio et al. [4] and Szegedy
et al. [34] as a starting point, there has been tremendous
research effort directed towards exploring methods that
generate adversarial examples [2, 10] as well as defenses
that aim at increasing robustness [16, 24]. The consistent
success of strong targeted adversarial attacks in computer
vision, like PGD [23] and C&W [7], suggests that an adver-
sary can basically create any desired classification output
by adding a suitable adversarial perturbation to the natural
image. This has also been impressively shown by Metzen et
al. [25] in the context of semantic segmentation. Here, the
authors were able to create universal, i.e. input-agnostic,
adversarial perturbations that lead to any desired target
segmentation. These adversarial attack results bring us to
the realization that the decision boundary of a conventional
deep neural network seems to be close to almost every
input image. In other words, the closeness of the decision
boundary to natural data points explains the vulnerability of
state-of-the-art ML models to certain input perturbations.
A vast number of adversarial defenses therefore try to in-
crease the minimal distance, also called margin in the input
space, of natural images to the decision boundary. Among
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other things, researchers have proposed regularization
penalties [15, 8], data augmentation techniques [35, 29]
and specific architectures [28, 31] to obtain a more desir-
able course of the decision boundary, and in consequence to
get to more robust classifiers. Unfortunately, the majority
of defenses have not succeeded and were ”broken” shortly
after their publication due to stronger adversaries [3]. In
general, PGD adversarial training is still viewed as the
most reliable and the most successful adversarial defense
[23]. But, it should be noted that adversarial training shows
promising results under very limited threat models and
tends to overfit on specific attacks instead of improving
general robustness [21].
This limited progress in increasing robustness has
led more and more researchers to the question whether
robustness can be obtained at all by deep neural networks
[11, 32, 30]. The well-known, but rather theoretical,
statement that neural networks with a single hidden layer
are universal function approximators has partly given us a
false sense of security. For example, recent work indicates
that commonly used neural network topologies with a
large number of relatively low-dimensional hidden layers
may not lead to universal function approximators [20].
Additionally, publications have shown empirically, as well
as theoretically, that the decision regions of modern ML
classifiers, i.e. the regions of the input space that lead to
a certain output class, tend to be connected sets [20, 12].
This strong topological restriction on the decision regions
might already limit the expressive power of these models
and thus, their maximal achievable robustness.
In addition, there have been efforts to derive general
robustness bounds for classes of classification problems,
independent of the used classification function. Fawzi et al.
[11] provide fundamental upper bounds on the achievable
robustness assuming that the natural data comes from a
smooth generative model. Under this assumption on the
origin of the data, they show that any type of classifier
is prone to adversarial perturbations as long as the latent
space of the generative model is high-dimensional.
Overall, we are still at an early stage of understanding the
decision making and limitations of deep neural networks.
Especially, the course of the decision boundary and fac-
tors that influence its course have to be explored in more
detail. Findings in this area can then guide us towards
promising adversarial defenses as well as general robust-
ness bounds. In this paper, we want to continue along this
path by providing an empirical study focusing on the dis-
tance of data points to the decision boundary and how this
margin evolves over the training of the classifier. To the
best of our knowledge, the change of the margin during the
training process has not yet been analyzed in the existing lit-
erature. Our experiments with neural network classifiers on
MNIST, FASHION-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 lead us to three
central observations:
• The decision boundary moves closer to training as well as
test images over training. This convergence of the deci-
sion boundary even continues in the late phases of train-
ing where the neural network already obtains low training
and test error rates.
• Adversarial training results in a significantly different de-
velopment of the decision boundary. Here, the average
distance to the decision boundary of the images stays at
a relatively high level over training. The clear down-
ward trend observable for standard training is damped
considerably, which underlines the success of adversarial
training in improving robustness for simple classification
tasks.
• Wrongly classified images from the natural data distri-
bution are on average significantly closer to the decision
boundary than correctly classified data points. During
training the decision boundary is pushed towards these
points, which implies that their already small distance
to the decision boundary decreases even further with in-
creasing epoch number. This observation holds for ad-
versarial as well as standard training.
Due to the success of adversarial attacks on ML models,
it is not surprising that the decision boundary is close to
the majority of natural data points after training. But, our
findings still challenge common beliefs about the training
of neural network classifiers. It does not seem to be true
that training moves the decision boundary away from the
training data in order to facilitate generalization, or at least
this is not true for all directions in the input space.
2. Background
In this section, we formalize the notion of decision
boundary, and summarize related work on the decision
boundary of deep neural networks. For our experiments it
will be crucial to calculate the minimal distance of an image
to the decision boundary of the classifier. Unfortunately,
calculating the exact margin in the input space is in general
intractable, thus one has to make use of a reasonable upper
bound. We will use DeepFool [26] for this margin approxi-
mation. Due to its significant role within the following em-
pirical study, we will recall the central intuition underlying
the DeepFool adversarial attack in this section.
2.1. The Decision Boundary
We define a classifier as a function f : Rn → Rc, where
n denotes the number of dimensions in the input space (e.g.
number of pixels in an image) and c is the number of clas-
sification classes. For an input point x ∈ Rn the output
f(x) can be interpreted as the vector of softmax values of
the classifier. The classification decision is then given by
kˆ(x) = argmax
k=1,...,c
fk(x).
With this notation, we can now define the decision boundary
D ⊆ Rn of f as the set
D := {x ∈ Rn | ∃k1, k2 = 1, ..., c, k1 6= k2,
fk1(x) = fk2(x) = maxk fk(x)}.
In other words, these are the points where the decision
of the classifier is tied. The margin d2(x) ∈ R≥0 of a data
point x is then given by
d2(x) = min
δ∈Rn
‖δ‖2
s.t. x+ δ ∈ D
(1)
In the above margin definition, we make use of the
`2-norm, but one can define the margin with respect to any
reasonable distance measure. In our empirical study, we
will also consider the margin with respect to the `∞-norm,
which we will denote d∞.
The existence of adversarial examples for state-of-the-art
neural networks indicates that natural images lie near the
decision boundary D with high probability, hence d2(x) is
small for most data points x. At the same time, deep neural
networks also tend to be rather robust to random noise [37].
It may thus be concluded that the decision boundary is
close in a ”few” directions, but further away with respect to
the majority of perturbation directions. In [17] the authors
confirm this observation by adding randomly sampled or-
thogonal directions to benign as well as adversarial images.
For the benign images, these sampled perturbations rarely
change the classification decision. On the other hand, they
observe that most of the adversarial examples generated by
the FGSM attack [14] are not at all robust to these random
distortions.
For our experiments, we do not want to rely on sampled
perturbations for the calculation of d2(x), but rather utilize
an optimization method. Since the margin optimization
problem (1) is intractable for deep neural networks, one
has to search for an approximate solution. To be more
precise, one searches for a small perturbation δ such that
kˆ(x + δ) 6= kˆ(x). Ideally, we then have d2(x) ≈ ‖δ‖2,
although x+ δ is not necessarily an element of D.
We will obtain the margin estimate with the help of Deep-
Fool, but one can also make use of other strong adversarial
attacks for the generation of δ. For example, in [27] the
authors use the PGD attack to approximate the distance of
training data to the decision boundary. They find that the
usual cross-entropy loss is one contributing factor to small
margins and that a differential training procedure leads to
more robust models.
However, DeepFool has proven to generate particularly
small adversarial perturbations which makes it suitable for
margin approximation. Jiang et al. [19] used a simplified
targeted version of DeepFool with a single iteration step
to estimate d2(x) for images of the training data set.
These distances then formed the basis for a measure which
correlates with the generalization gap of a trained neural
network.
Apart from determining the distance to the decision
boundary, it is also desirable to understand more general
geometric properties of the decision boundary. Already
in the early adversarial robustness literature, it has been
hypothesized that the decision boundary of a deep neural
network locally resembles the decision boundary of a linear
classifier. In [14] the authors claim that this ”too” linear
behavior explains the success of the FGSM adversarial
attack which utilizes the linearization of the loss function
of the network. More recently, Fawzi et al. [12] empirically
showed that the decision boundary near natural images
is flat in most directions, and curved only in very few
directions. Furthermore, their results suggest that the
decision boundary is biased towards negative curvatures.
2.2. DeepFool
DeepFool is an untargeted, iterative adversarial attack
which stops as soon as a perturbation δ has been found
with kˆ(x0 + δ) 6= kˆ(x0) for some given data point x0.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] introduced DeepFool with
the goal to provide a method that can calculate adversarial
perturbations with similar efficiency as FGSM (or compa-
rable attacks like BIM [6] and PGD [23]), but which at the
same time leads to a more accurate approximation of the
robustness of f at x0. The authors achieve this by making
use of the well-understood orthogonal projection mapping
of a point onto the decision boundary of an affine classifier.
To be more specific, in every iteration step of DeepFool
the class probability functions fk, k = 1, ..., c, of the clas-
sifier f are linearized around the current position xi. Then,
one calculates the smallest perturbation δi with respect to
the `2-norm which moves xi onto the decision boundary of
the linearized model of f . This perturbation δi can be writ-
ten down in closed form:
δi :=
|flˆ(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)|
‖∇flˆ(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)‖22
(∇flˆ(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi))
with index
lˆ = lˆ(xi) := argmink 6=kˆ(x0)
|flˆ(xi)(xi)− fkˆ(x0)(xi)|
‖∇flˆ(xi)(xi)−∇fkˆ(x0)(xi)‖2
.
Now, let N denote the stopping index of this iterative
scheme for image x0, i.e. kˆ(xN ) 6= kˆ(x0). Then, the de-
sired adversarial perturbation is given by
δ =
N−1∑
i=0
δi.
Overall, the DeepFool attack can be viewed as a function
DeepFool : Rn → Rn which takes an image x0 as input
and returns a corresponding adversarial perturbation δ for
the given classifier f . In the original paper, the authors
also formulate adaptations of the DeepFool algorithm
to any `p-distance measure for p ∈ [1,∞]. Since we
also want to consider the margin with respect to the
`∞-norm in our empirical study, we will use the `∞
adaptation for these approximations. For the closed form
formula of `∞-DeepFool we refer to the original paper [26].
3. Experimental Results
The objective of the experiments is to track the `2-norm
margin values d2 as well as the `∞-norm margin values d∞
for training data as well as test data over the training pro-
cess of a deep neural network. We obtain these approxi-
mate distances of images to the decision boundary with the
`2-DeepFool algorithm and the `∞-DeepFool algorithm, re-
spectively. Hence, we assume that
d2(x) = ‖DeepFool2(x)‖2
and
d∞(x) = ‖DeepFool∞(x)‖∞
for any image x. In order to derive general observations,
we will analyze the average margin and the corresponding
standard error over large parts of the training as well as the
test data set in every training epoch. To be more precise, for
an image data set D we report
davg2 :=
1
|D|
∑
xi∈D
d2(xi), d
avg
∞ :=
1
|D|
∑
xi∈D
d∞(xi)
and
dse2 :=
1
|D|
√∑
xi∈D
(d2(xi)− davg2 )2,
dse∞ :=
1
|D|
√∑
xi∈D
(d∞(xi)− davg∞ )2,
where |D| denotes the cardinality of the image set D. For
one of the following observations we will also plot the
distributions d2(x) and d∞(x) for all images x ∈ D in
several training epochs. These distribution visualizations
help us to better understand how the different images
contributed to the calculated average margin and standard
error.
It should be noted that we only use successful adversarial
perturbations for the margin approximation. Thus, if the
DeepFool attack is not able to find a small adversarial
perturbation for a given image, we iteratively perturb the
image with Gaussian noise and retry DeepFool on the per-
turbed image until we find a successful adversarial example.
To ensure consistency of our observations, we train sev-
eral classifiers with different architectures and computer
vision tasks. In particular, we conduct experiments on
MNIST, FASHION-MNIST, and CIFAR-10. In the following
figures we will present the experimental results for a con-
volutional neural network trained on the FASHION-MNIST
data set. The given graphs summarize our results for the
first 40 epochs of training. After this limited training period,
the FASHION-MNIST model obtains good, but not yet com-
petetive, error rates. However, all our central observations
can already be made during the first 40 epochs, and they
continue to hold when we extend the training time. Com-
parable graphs for different architectures and for the other
tasks - MNIST and CIFAR-10 - can be found in Appendix
A. Overall, our experiments suggest three major findings
which we will discuss separately in the following sections.
Observation 1: Standard Training
Due to the vulnerability of state-of-the-art neural
networks to adversarial examples, we know that at least a
large portion of the training images as well as test images
lie close to the decision boundary after training. As a
consequence, we expect low values for the average `2-norm
margin davg2 and the average `∞-norm margin d
avg
∞ for
a trained classifier. But it is still unclear how the margin
metrics davg2 and d
avg
∞ evolve over the training process.
To analyze this, we train a convolutional and a dense
architecture with cross-entropy loss for the three given
computer vision tasks. Sample results for the convolutional
neural network (CNN) on FASHION-MNIST are shown in
Figure 1. In general, we observe a similar development of
the average margins and their standard errors during the
training process for all models and tasks.
After the weight initialization - i.e. before the first train-
ing weight update - test and training images are very close
to the decision boundary. After the first epoch, davg2 as
well as davg∞ jump to a higher level. Thus, already the first
training epoch changes the course of the decision boundary
decisively, although it does not yet lead to a classifier with
optimal train and test accuracy. In the subsequent epochs,
the average margins have a clear downward trend and they
never get back to the peak of the first epoch. Especially in
Figure 1. Experimental results of a convolutional neural network (CNN) on the FASHION-MNIST dataset: (1) Left: Development of
training and test error; (2) Middle: Development of average `2-margin davg2 and standard error d
se
2 over 1000 randomly picked images
from the training and the test data set; (3) Right: Development of average `∞-margin davg∞ and standard error dse∞ over 1000 randomly
picked images from the training and the test data set.
the early training epochs, the level of davg2 and d
avg
∞ drops
significantly. The margins decrease less strictly in later
phases of the training, but they still decrease noticeably.
Overall, we see a strong negative correlation between the
average distance to the decision boundary and the training
(or test) accuracy. At the same time, the standard errors
dse2 and d
se
∞ remain relatively small and stable throughout
the whole training. It should also be noted that there is
no significant difference between the margin values of the
training and the test set. Hence, the decision boundary does
not appear to be closer to test images compared to training
images.
From these results, we can derive the general finding
that the decision boundary moves closer to training as well
as test images during training. This observed convergence
of the decision boundary is an undesirable side effect of
training, since it shows that trained models with state-of-
the-art test accuracy will end up with relatively low average
margins. In particular, increasing the training time of a
model might lead to a decrease in robustness.
Unfortunately, we can not yet offer a clear and provable
explanation for this behavior of the decision boundary dur-
ing training. At first glance, one might try to justify this
observation by assuming a lack of model capacity. In other
words, the chosen model architectures might just not be able
to simultaneously achieve good accuracies as well as suf-
ficient decision boundary margins. The existence of this
trade-off between performance and robustness would then
automatically imply a decrease of the margins during train-
ing, since the cross-entropy function forces the network to
achieve high accuracy in every training epoch.
Alternatively, one might be tempted to view this phe-
nomenon as a sign of overfitting on the training data, be-
cause overfitting also leads to a decision boundary which
is getting unnecessarily close to natural data points. But,
both hypotheses are hard to validate, and we even notice as-
pects of our experimental results contradicting these ideas.
For example, the distances to the decision boundary decline
throughout phases of the training where the test error is
also decreasing significantly. This contradicts the overfit-
ting explanation, because overfitting would manifest itself
in a downturn of the test accuracy. On the other hand, the
following section and its related experiments will show that
the exact same model architectures can also lead to a totally
different development of the decision boundary, which con-
futes the lack of model capacity explanation.
Thus, the question remains why this phenomenon of de-
creasing average margins occurs and whether this move-
ment of the decision boundary can be prevented.
Observation 2: Adversarial Training
We again train convolutional and dense neural networks
on MNIST and FASHION-MNIST, but this time perform ad-
versarial training. We keep the cross-entropy loss function
and network architectures as in the previous experiments.
In every training batch, one now replaces 50% of the
images by adversarial images generated by the PGD attack.
Then, we again track the average distances of natural train
as well as test images to the decision boundary with respect
to the `2- and the `∞-norm. In Figure 2 we summarize the
results for the CNN architecture on FASHION-MNIST.
As before, one notices a jump of the average margins after
the first epoch of training compared to the level at network
initialization. However, in the following epochs, we
observe significant deviations from the results of standard
training. After the first epoch, davg2 as well as d
avg
∞ remain
at a relatively high level compared to standard training.
Even though a slight downward trend is observable, it is
Figure 2. Experimental results of a convolutional neural network (CNN) with PGD adversarial training on the FASHION-MNIST dataset:
(1) Left: Development of training and test error; (2) Middle: Development of average `2-margin davg2 and standard error d
se
2 over 1000
randomly picked images from the training and the test data set; (3) Right: Development of average `∞-margin davg∞ and standard error dse∞
over 1000 randomly picked images from the training and the test data set.
not as severe as in the setting considered before. It can also
be noticed that this downward trend starts in later epochs
compared to standard training. Our experimental results
for MNIST even show a slight upward trend of the average
margins with training time (see: Appendix A). At the same
time, the standard errors dse2 and d
se
∞ are comparable to
the past experiments, i.e. remain at a rather stable level
throughout training for all computer vision tasks.
We come to the conclusion that the previously observed
steady decrease of the average margins is not an inevitable
phenomenon. The injection of PGD adversarial examples
into the training set leads to a decision boundary which
is further away from natural data points in comparison
to a decision boundary of a classically trained model.
Furthermore, the experiments suggest that the robustness
of the adversarially trained classifier does not significantly
degrade throughout training time. At least for these simple
computer vision tasks, we can therefore confirm the general
belief that PGD adversarial training creates comparably
robust models.
A further interesting aspect is the high level of average
margin size measured in the `2-norm, although the PGD
attack is concerned with finding small `∞-norm adversar-
ial perturbations. Hence, the `∞-based adversarial training
procedure was also able to increase the minimal `2-distance
to the decision boundary for a large number of training and
test images. It is still an open research question to which ex-
tent adversarial training can be used to robustify classifiers
against broad classes of adversarial attacks. Past studies
suggested that adversarial training does not transfer well be-
tween imperceptibility metrics, in particular that `∞-based
adversarial training does not necessarily lead to robustness
with respect to other `p-norms, e.g. [21]. Our results in-
dicate that there actually exist settings, where the positive
impact of adversarial training transfers to broader classes of
perturbations.
Observation 3: Wrongly Classified Images
Up until now, we have primarily focused on average
decision boundary margins and standard errors during
the training process. These aggregated statistical values
only provide a limited understanding of the distances of
training and test images to the decision boundary. We,
therefore, analyze the distribution of d2(x) and d∞(x) for
images x from the training as well as the test set at different
training epochs. We again consider the classically trained
models and the models trained with PGD adversarial
training. Figure 3 shows sample distributions of d2(x)
for the classically and the adversarially trained CNN on
FASHION-MNIST.
Additionally, we separate correctly and incorrectly clas-
sified images in these distribution graphs, which directly
brings us to one apparent realization. The images that were
assigned to the wrong class by the deep neural network
tend to lie significantly closer to the decision boundary
than correctly classified ones. The calculated margins also
have a smaller empirical variance (or standard error), hence
they are rather concentrated around the mean of the margin
approximates.
The distribution of correctly classified images and the
distribution of incorrectly classified images wander more
and more in the direction of the origin during standard
training of a model. This underlines again that the decision
boundary moves closer to natural images over the training
process (see also: Figure 4). As a consequence, images
which were wrongly classified by a fully trained model will
be comparably easy to push over the decision boundary via
Figure 3. Sample L2-margin distributions for 1000 training images and the training epochs 10, 20 and 40: (1) First row: d2(x) distribution
for the classically trained CNN on FASHION-MNIST; (2) Second row: d2(x) distribution for the adversarially trained CNN on FASHION-
MNIST.
Figure 4. Development of average margins and standard errors of the classically trained CNN on FASHION-MNIST. For the calculation
of these values we used 1000 randomly picked images of the test set: (1) Left plot: development of davg2 ; (2) Right plot: development of
davg∞ .
a small perturbation. In the future, this observation might
be useful for the detection of misclassified, natural images.
A possible explanation for this large margin difference
between correctly and incorrectly classified images is the
fact that the cross-entropy loss punishes wrong decisions
during training. Thus, the decision boundary is pushed
towards these mistakes, in order to turn these wrong
Figure 5. This Sankey plot visualizes the movement of natural im-
ages between correct and incorrect classification for the classically
trained CNN over the different epochs of training. The plot is
based on the whole FASHION-MNIST training set.
decisions into correctly classified images. This directly
implies that the distance to the decision boundary of these
wrongly classified images decreases from one epoch to the
next, i.e. the general movement of the decision boundary
towards natural data points is reinforced. This hypothesis is
also supported by the given Sankey diagrams in Figure 5.
Here, we observe that the majority of incorrectly classified
images in one training epoch has also been incorrect in
the prior epoch. Hence, the average margin values and
the margin distributions of the wrongly classified images
of two adjacent epochs rely largely on the same images
and thus, allow the statement that the decision boundary is
pushed towards these images.
The Sankey plots also show that the decision boundary
eventually reaches large parts of the initially misclassified
images. These images become correctly classified images,
which also results in a smaller training and test error
rate. This automatically leads to new correctly classified
images with a low distance to the decision boundary in
every training epoch. Since the decision boundary has just
reached these images and is thus still very close, they have
a negative impact on the average margin of the correctly
classified images. However, it should be noted that the
different distribution graphs also indicate a general trend
of the correctly classified images towards smaller margins,
which can not all be attributed to the switch of incorrectly
classified images to correctly classified images.
It is not surprising that adversarially trained models still
show the same phenomenon of decreasing margins for in-
correctly classified images, while at the same time being
able to stabilize the average margins of the training and test
set. In Figure 6 we see that the average `∞-margins for the
incorrectly classified images have a clear downward trend
after the first training epochs. It becomes obvious that the
decision boundary of an adversarially trained classifier tries
to balance two goals encoded in the loss function and train-
ing procedure. It tries to achieve a high accuracy on the
Figure 6. Development of `∞ average margin davg∞ and standard
error dse∞ of adversarially trained CNN on FASHION-MNIST. For
the calculation of these values we used 1000 randomly picked im-
ages of the test set.
training set and simultaneously, to be robust in the neigh-
borhood of training images. The decreasing margins of
wrongly classified images resemble the attempt to increase
accuracy, while the increasing, or at least stable, margins
of correctly classified images show the desired increase in
robustness.
4. Future Work & Conclusion
In this empirical study, we have seen that the decision
boundary of a state-of-the-art deep neural network moves
closer to training and test images during training. The
movement of the decision boundary even continues in late
phases of training, although the test and training accuracy
barely changes at this point. This leads to the conclusion
that fully trained models are susceptible to adversarial
perturbations as well as general corruption noise.
On the other hand, adversarial training has the potential
to prevent this undesired downward trend of the distances
to the decision boundary. In general, the average margin
of training and test data is at a higher level in this adapted
training procedure. Besides, we even noticed a transfer of
robustness between the `2-norm and the `∞-norm for the
MNIST and FASHION-MNIST task.
Furthermore, for trained classifiers there exists a significant
difference between correctly and incorrectly classified
images concerning their distances to the decision boundary.
Incorrectly classified images lie a lot closer to the decision
boundary than correctly classified images, and here the
decision boundary comes closer to these images over
training, too. This observation remains present for both
standard and adversarial training.
This empirical study contributes to a better understand-
ing of the decision boundary, but there are still a lot of
open research questions - even related to the above results.
Our observations put the widely studied problem of deep
neural networks being susceptible to adversarial examples
into a different light. The vulnerability itself indicates that
the decision boundary of neural networks is close to most
natural images after training. However, we have found that
this property of neural networks is not predetermined by
their initialization or architecture. Rather, this insufficiency
is created during training. Therefore, from our perspective,
it seems most promising to further study the influence of
loss functions and training procedures on the margins.
Nevertheless, in future experiments one has to analyze
whether the given observations hold for more varying
network architectures and complex computer vision tasks.
It is also crucial to double check the exactness of the
DeepFool margin approximates. At this point, one could
make use of other strong adversarial attacks, or even apply
formal verification techniques to derive lower bounds for
the margins of data points. These further investigations will
hopefully help us to identify provable explanations for the
observed phenomena.
Recently, poor calibration has also been proposed as a
potential contributing factor to the robustness issues of ML
models. It has been argued that, due to bad uncertainty
estimates, the network is not able to identify shifts in the
data distribution, that is, out-of-sample instances [5, 33].
This claim is supported by [22] that find better calibrated
models are able to detect certain classes of adversarial
examples. Therefore, it is interesting to also explore the
connection between calibration and the development of the
distance to the decision boundary over training in more
detail. In our third observation we have already seen that
the distance to the decision boundary can be a helpful un-
certainty metric. There is a significant difference between
correctly and incorrectly classified images concerning
their margins, although the network usually assigns high
confidence scores to both classes of images - which is a
clear sign of poor calibration.
In general, we hope that more researchers pick up on the
idea to track changes of the decision boundary throughout
training, instead of solely concentrating on fully trained net-
works. This adds a new dimension to the robustness eval-
uation of a classifier and gives us a better chance to detect
different causes of insufficient adversarial and corruption
robustness.
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A. Results for MNIST
Figure 7. In (a) on the left, we observe that the train and test error both converge quickly to almost 0.
In (b) we see that even though there is little room for improvement in the test error, the upper bound to the distance to the decision boundary
is decreasing in a small but visible fashion after the first epoch supporting observation 1.
Figure 8. (a) The train and test errors also converge quickly to near optimal performance for adversarial training on MNIST.
(b) davg2 is rather increasing during adversarial training and nearly twice as high as for standard training which is evidence for observation
2.
For MNIST we used a dense network architecture in contrast to the CNN architecture which we used for FASHION-MNIST.
In Figure 7 we see that observation 1 is supported even though the network quickly achieves near optimal test error. Figure 8
supports observation 2 showing that davg2 is nearly twice as high for adversarial training as for standard training. In Figure 9
we even see a steady increase for davg∞ during adversarial training. Finally, Figure 10 is evidence for observation 3. Notice
that the standard error generally is larger for incorrectly classified samples than for correctly classified ones, since there are
far fewer of them due to the small error on train and test set.
Figure 9. davg∞ is steadily increasing for PGD adversarial training.
Figure 10. (a) and (b): For a dense network on FASHION MNIST with standard training, davg2 and d
avg
∞ are much higher for correctly
classified data points than for incorrectly classified ones supporting observation 3.
Figure 11. Sample davg∞ distributions for 1000 training images and the training epochs 10, 20 and 40: (1) First row: davg∞ (x) distribution
for the classically trained dense network on MNIST; (2) Second row: d∞(x)avg distribution for the adversarially trained dense network on
MNIST.
B. Work in Progress Notice
This document is still work in progress and we are planning to release a discussion of the network architectures as well
the results for CIFAR-10 in a future version.
